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WHY ARBITRATORS NOT JUDGES?
Comments on the European Commission’s approach to investor-state arbitration
in TTIP and CETA
Gus Van Harten
Associate Professor
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
gvanharten@osgoode.yorku.ca
3 July 2014
I respond to the European Commission’s invitation for comment on its approach to investment
protection and investor-state arbitration in the proposed EU-United States Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). I am a Canadian academic specializing in international
investment law and am grateful for the opportunity to comment. Further information on the
consultation is available here: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179.
The consultation does not ask the essential question: why is investor-state arbitration necessary
in TTIP or CETA? To answer this question rigorously would require a careful framing of the
question and comprehensive assessment of economic, political, and legal aspects of the use and
impact of investor-state arbitration. For example, the consultation would need to examine:
•
•
•
•

the costs and benefits of investor-state arbitration in broad terms;
the implications of investor-state arbitration for principles such as democratic choice,
regulatory flexibility, and market efficiency;
the compatibility of investor-state arbitration with values of judicial decision-making
including, for example, values of judicial independence, openness, and procedural
fairness; and
the relative utility and role of alternative means – such as domestic and European courts,
state-to-state adjudication, and market mechanisms including investment contracts and
risk insurance – to protect foreign investors; and

The consultation is not framed to address any of these issues. As a result, it is not designed to
obtain a wide range of available evidence and information that would cast doubt on or outright
contradict common claims of proponents of investor-state arbitration that:
•
•
•
•
•
•

treaty-based investor-state arbitration encourages foreign investment, contributes to
market freedom, or encourages “good governance”;
states were well-informed when they entered into large numbers of investment treaties in
the past;
foreign investors are at a political disadvantage relative to domestic investors and other
actors;
domestic courts in any given country mistreat or discriminate against foreign investors;
arbitrators have applied investment treaties in a balanced way; and
investor-state arbitration is a neutral and independent process of adjudication.
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These claims are all open to significant doubt based on evidence and argument that will not be
heard because the Commission has not posed the essential question. Indeed, I am aware of
colleagues who have extensive relevant evidence but who have opted not to participate in the
consultation because the essential question was not asked.
In turn, without a strong case – based on careful evaluation of evidence and fulsome exchange of
views – for granting special rights and privileges to foreign investors relative to all other actors,
investor-state arbitration should not be included in the TTIP. Giving a special status to any actor
in law or access to public funds, especially the largest (especially U.S.-based) companies in the
world, 1 calls for a clear justification based on positive evidence that doing so will deliver a
public benefit to outweigh the disadvantages to other actors and costs to the public. Otherwise,
the Commission would be proceeding with a major expansion of investor-state arbitration –
extending its coverage of international FDI flows by about 300% of its current coverage based
on existing treaties – without a careful review of the significant risks to public funds and
regulatory capacity; to the principle of a level playing field for European and extra-European
companies; and to established structures of public accountability, regulatory flexibility, and
judicial independence.
The remainder of this submission is narrowly focused due to the limited parameters of the
consultation text. Many of the issues discussed arise from relatively minor concerns about textual
clarification and from the Commission’s limited proposals to reform investor-state arbitration. In
the comment, I have used in-text citations that are easily followed up by an online search; further
references for any statement in this comment are available on request.

1

Approximately 54% of the total compensation awarded (about $5.1 billion) in the 38 known investment
treaty awards of over $10 million up to June 2, 2014 was awarded to U.S. companies. 97% of this
compensation was awarded to U.S. companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. The U.S.
share of total compensation in these cases rises to about 59% after accounting for apparent forumshopping.
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General response to the Commission’s Introduction
In its Introduction, the Commission puts far too much faith in its ability, through textual
clarifications, to reign in arbitrators and their expansive tendencies. Investor-state arbitration is a
cat-and-mouse game that favours the arbitrators – most importantly, a few dozen repeat players
who have driven interpretation of the treaties – who are not subject to judicial override if they
interpret a treaty incorrectly or unreasonably and who have a track record of exploiting legal
ambiguity to expand their power over states, investors, public money, and so on.
On the state’s right to regulate, if the Commission intends to affirm and protect this right, it must
say so clearly and unequivocally in the treaty alongside the treaty’s elaborate rights for foreign
investors. It is insufficient, indeed damaging, to affirm the right to regulate only as part of an
aspirational statement in a preamble or elsewhere in the treaty. Likewise, the Commission’s
statement in the consultation text that it intends to affirm the right to regulate is useless legally
and misleading to the public; the statement must be included in the treaty itself as a substantive
right of the state which has been agreed by the states parties.
Some of the Commission’s specific statements about textual clarifications are misleading,
especially with respect to foreign investors’ expansively-interpreted right to “fair and equitable
treatment” and the corresponding impact of this right on the scope and reliability of the state’s
ability to take legislative, regulatory, and judicial decisions free from onerous fiscal liability.
Specific response to the Commission’s Introduction

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 2: “Investment protection
provisions consist of a limited number of
standards guaranteeing that governments will
respect certain fundamental principles of
treatment that a foreign investor can rely upon
when making a decision to invest. These
fundamental principles of treatment are
reflected in the rights that democratic
governments grant to their own citizens and
companies (such as no expropriation without
compensation, access to justice, protection
against coercion and harassment, nondiscrimination), but they are not always
guaranteed for foreigners or foreign
companies.”

If these fundamental principles are granted in
democratic countries, then why is investorstate arbitration required as an add-on to
domestic courts in those countries?
Presumably, in many or most cases, foreign
investors enjoy protection in relation to these
principles in democratic countries. If so,
foreign investors should be required, like any
other foreign national, to go to domestic courts
before bringing an international claim unless
they can show that the courts would not
guarantee compensation for expropriation,
access to justice, and so on.
Otherwise, the assumption is that domestic
courts in all affected countries systematically
do not offer justice to foreign investors. This is
3
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clearly incorrect even if one assumed that
investor-state arbitration itself provided fair
and independent adjudication in the manner of
a domestic or regional court in a democratic
state.
If there is a wider concern that domestic courts
take too long or are otherwise insufficient to
protect foreign investors, then the answer is to
replace courts with arbitrators for everyone
including domestic persons and foreigners who
are not investors. The far-reaching
consequences of this proposition itself reveal
how radical is the use of investor-state
arbitration without any duty to resort to
domestic courts where they offer justice and
are reasonably-available. To be clear, the
Commission’s proposals do not include this
basic duty to resort to domestic remedies,
which applies in all comparable international
courts and tribunals where individuals can
bring an international claim against a state in
its sovereign capacity.

PDF version, page 2: “At the same time
foreign investors, just as domestic ones, must
fully respect the domestic legal regime of the
host country.”

This raises an important question: what if a
foreign investor does not fully respect the
domestic legal regime and the country’s
domestic courts are inadequate to ensure that it
does?
One can imagine many scenarios in which
domestic actors, other foreigners, or other
foreign investors would suffer because of a
foreign companies’ misconduct. Yet these
other actors would be limited to the presumed
ghetto of domestic courts with no right to opt
out of the domestic legal system in favour of
individual-state arbitration. This reveals the
one-sidedness of investor-state arbitration in
favour of foreign investors.

4
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PDF version, page 2: “The overall purpose of
international investment agreements is to
ensure that the country hosting an investment
treats foreign investors in accordance with
these fundamental principles, while
maintaining the right to take measures for the
public good according to the level of ambition
that they deem appropriate.”

If the purpose is to ensure treatment of foreign
investors in accordance with fundamental
principles of justice and non-discrimination,
then foreign investors alone should not have
special access to an adjudicative process where
for-profit arbitrators instead of judges decide
the investor’s entitlement to public money.
If the intent really is to maintain the right of a
state to take measures for the public good,
according to the level of ambition that the state
deems appropriate, then this must be stated
clearly and unequivocally in the treaty text as a
substantive right of the state. It is not in the
Commission’s proposals based on the CanadaEU CETA. It is highly misleading for the
Commission to declare this intention in a
consultation document but not include it as a
substantive right of states in the treaty.

PDF version, page 2: “The specific EU
objective in our trade and investment
agreements, or in the investment protection
section of the TTIP, is to strengthen the
balance between investment protection and the
right to regulate, through clarifying and
improving the substantive investment
protection provisions while at the same time
preserving the right of States to take measures
for legitimate public policy objectives.”

Again, if this is the intent, it must be stated
clearly and unequivocally in the treaty. That is,
a clear and unequivocal statement of the right
to regulate must be included in the text – not
only as an aspirational statement in a preamble
or elsewhere – alongside the many elaborate
rights for foreign investors.

PDF version, page 2: “More precisely, the EU
is introducing modern and innovative
provisions clarifying the meaning of those
investment protection standards that have
raised concerns in the past, notably: fair and
equitable treatment (which in the EU's
approach will be limited to a closed list of
basic rights for investors) and indirect
expropriation (which in the EU's approach will

The Commissions’ clarification in the CanadaEU CETA of some aspects of the substantive
standards, primarily indirect expropriation, is
an improvement.

For examples of a clear statement of the right
to regulate, see Article 12 of the Havana
Charter of 1948 and the second paragraph of
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.

On the other hand, the Commission’s
clarification on fair and equitable treatment
codifies a major expansion of this term
compared to its widely-accepted customary
5
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ensure that measures taken for legitimate
public policy objectives cannot be considered
to be an indirect expropriation). Under the
EU's approach, the right to regulate is
confirmed as a basic underlying principle. The
EU also wants to ensure that all necessary
exceptions and safeguards are in place, thus
retaining essential public policy space for
example to deal with a financial crisis.”

meaning before the investor-state arbitrators
came on the scene about 15 years ago. In
particular, the Commission’s approach expands
significantly the meaning of fair and equitable
treatment as accepted by Canada, the U.S. and
Mexico in the NAFTA context. Thus, the
Commission endorses the arbitrators’ power
grab on fair and equitable treatment and, in
turn, heightens the risk to the right to regulate.
In this and other ways, the Commission’s
approach has undermined, not affirmed, the
right to regulate. If the EU wishes to retain
policy space for the state, it needs to include a
statement of the right to regulate that applies to
all standards of investor protection in the treaty
and that is not limited to any particular area of
decision-making such as financial regulation.
The text is far from this basic balancing of the
state’s right to regulate and foreign investors’
rights and protections. This makes it more not
less likely that arbitrators will continue to
erode the right to regulate in their application
of the treaty.

6
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General response to Question 1: Scope of the substantive investment protection provisions
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the objectives and approach taken in relation to the scope of
the substantive investment protection provisions in TTIP?
The Commission’s approach to the substantive investment provisions is inadequate and in some
respects damaging. The Commission alludes to the serious problem of past abuse of investorstate arbitration including by arbitrators themselves. Yet the Commission offers only limited and
incomplete fixes based on unsubstantiated (and sometimes erroneous) claims about past
arbitrator decision-making.
My coding of awards – with the support of law students acting as research assistants – indicates a
strong tendency of the arbitrators to prefer expansive (pro-claimant) approaches even in the face
of relatively clear treaty language favouring restraint. 2 The Commission’s proposed clarifications
are a weak response to that record. It is as if the purpose of the Commission is to pretend to
reform arbitrator power in order, at all costs, to preserve it.
Specific response to Question 1: Scope of the substantive investment protection provisions
Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 3: “At the same time, most
bilateral investment agreements refer to
“investments made in accordance with
applicable law”. This reference has worked
well and has allowed ISDS tribunals to refuse
to grant investment protection to investors who
have not respected the law of the host state
when making the investment (for example, by
structuring the investment in such a way as to
circumvent clear prohibitions in the law of the
host state, or by procuring an investment
fraudulently or through bribery).”

The Commission does not refer to any treaties
or arbitration decisions to substantiate its
claim.
My own systematic research appears not to
support the Commission’s claim. With three
research assistants, I reviewed publiclyavailable awards in 140 known cases to MayJune 2010 to identify how a tribunal appeared
to allocate the onus on the issue of whether an
investment was permissible due to alleged noncompliance with domestic law or corruption.
We found nine cases in which the issue was
decided one way or the other, only three of
which appear to support the Commission’s
claim that the language noted here “has worked

2

See G. Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment
Treaty Arbitration (Oxford: OUP, 2013) gb; G. Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical
Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50 OHLJ 211.
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well” to avoid circumvention of domestic law
or counteract fraud or bribery. 3 The remaining
six cases appear to contradict the
Commission’s claim. 4
If the Commission wished to ensure that
investments circumventing domestic law or
depending on fraud or bribery are not
protected, it should say so clearly and
unequivocally in the treaty. The Canada-EU
CETA, as presented by the Commission, does
not include such statements. If they could not
be negotiated with Canada, what likelihood is
there that the Commission will negotiate them
with the United States?

PDF version, page 3: “The EU wants to avoid
abuse [i.e. investor claims based on mailbox or
shell companies]. This is achieved primarily by
improving the definition of “investor”, thus
eliminating so –called “shell” or “mailbox”
companies owned by nationals of third
countries from the scope: in order to qualify as
a legitimate investor of a Party, a juridical
person must have substantial business activities
in the territory of that Party.”

I commend the Commission for recognizing
that some investment treaty claims, including
under European investment treaties, have been
abusive due to the use of shell companies to
manipulate investor nationality. Many
arbitrators have allowed this abuse with
significant implications for public budgets and
the reliability of the right to regulate.

PDF version, page 3: “At the same time, the
EU wants to rely on past treaty practice with a
proven track record. The reference to
“investments made in accordance with the
applicable law” is one such example. Another
is the clarification that protection is only
granted in situations where investors have
already committed substantial resources in the
host state - and not when they are simply at the

Again, the Commission does not include
references to substantiate its claim about past
treaty practice. The results of our systematic
coding of awards, mentioned above, appear to
contradict the claim.
Limiting the scope of investment protection to
investors who own assets, rather than those
merely planning to do so, is useful. Yet, if the

3

Yaung Chi Oo v Myanmar (31 March 2003, para 27 and 53-63); Fraport v Philippines (16 August 2007,
para 315, 319, 327, 333, 343-8, 350-6, 394-6, 402, and 404); Plama v Bulgaria (27 August 2008, para
112-39).
4
Olguín v Paraguay (8 August 2000, para 28); Swembalt v Latvia (23 October 2010, para 32-5); Aguas
del Tunari v Bolivia (21 October 2005, para 188-92 and 204); Desert Line Projects v Yemen (6 February
2008, para 99, 102, 105-6, 109, and 116); Rumeli v Kazakhstan (29 July 2008, para 318-29); and Siemens
v Argentina (where Argentina was reportedly not permitted to introduce evidence and argument on the
issue of alleged corrupt activities by the claimant).
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stage where they are planning to do so.”

goal was to check abuse of shell companies to
manipulate investor nationality, this can and
would need to be addressed directly and
comprehensively, as discussed below.

General response to Question 2: Non-discriminatory treatment for investors
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the EU approach to non –discrimination in relation to the
TTIP? Please explain.
The Commission’s approach to non-discrimination provisions is flawed. It undermines the goal
of a level market playing field and the state’s right to regulate.
On national treatment, the Commission reaffirms the practice of discriminating inappropriately
in favour of foreign investors at the expense of domestic investors.
On MFN treatment, the Commission appears unaware of or unconcerned by the threat posed by
past expansive interpretations of MFN treatment. In particular, the Canada-EU CETA text does
not reflect the Commission’s stated intent to block arbitrators from using the MFN standard to
import substantive standards from other treaties. This creates significant uncertainty for states
and investors and jeopardizes all of the Commission’s textual clarifications of fair and equitable
treatment and indirect expropriation. It provides abundant opportunity for creating lawyering and
adventurous interpretation. It raises questions about the Commission’s understanding of MFN
treatment and its interaction with other treaty standards.
Specific response to Question 2: Non-discriminatory treatment for investors

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 4: “This [nondiscrimination standard] ensures a level
playing field between foreign investors and
local investors or investors from other
countries.”

The non-discrimination standard does not
ensure a level playing field between foreign
and domestic (or third-state) investors. It
guarantees that foreign investors receive “no
less favourable treatment” than other investors,
thus allowing more favourable treatment for
foreign investors. This establishes the principle
of an un-level playing field in favour of the
foreign investor.
To ensure a level playing field, investment
treaties would need to (a) state this intention
clearly and (b) prohibit discrimination based
9
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on investor nationality. Where a treaty
prohibits less favourable treatment for foreign
investors, this indicates an intention to allow
discrimination against domestic investors.

PDF version, page 4: “The standards of
national treatment and most-favoured nation
(MFN) treatment are considered to be key
provisions of investment agreements and
therefore they have been consistently included
in such agreements, although with some
variation in substance.”

The language of both national treatment and
MFN treatment needs to be overhauled so as
not to favour foreign over domestic investors.
For example, MFN treatment has been used by
arbitrators to transplant dispute resolution and
substantive provisions from other treaties. This
needs to be controlled in clear and unequivocal
terms, as discussed below.

PDF version, page 4: “The situation is
different with regard to the right of
establishment, where the Parties may choose
whether or not to open certain markets or
sectors, as they see fit.”

It is positive that the Commission has
committed to accept this flexibility in relation
to pre-establishment national treatment (socalled right of establishment). It is an open
question whether the U.S. would agree to this
position given its past insistence on preestablishment national treatment, subject to
investor-state arbitration.

PDF version, page 4: “Regarding MFN, most
investment agreements do not clarify whether
foreign investors are entitled to take advantage
of procedural or substantive provisions
contained in other past or future agreements
concluded by the host country. Thus, investors
may be able to claim that they are entitled to
benefit from any provision of another
agreement that they consider to be more
favourable, which may even permit the
application of an entirely new standard of
protection that was not found in the original
agreement. In practice, this is commonly
referred to as ‘importation of standards’.”

If this is the Commission’s intent, it has failed
to achieve its goal in the Canada-EU CETA.
The CETA text precludes the importation of
procedural but not substantive provisions from
other agreements. As a result, any steps by the
Commission to clarify the scope and content of
investment protection to preserve the right to
regulate have been undermined by the treaty’s
approach to MFN treatment.

PDF version, page 4: “On the "importation of
standards" issue, the EU seeks to clarify that
MFN does not allow procedural or substantive
provisions to be imported from other
agreements.“

Even if the treaty precluded the importation of
new standards from other treaties, this would
not address the arbitrators’ use of MFN
treatment to import more favourable
descriptions of a standard from one treaty into
another treaty that contains the same
substantive provision. This approach to MFN
jeopardizes the “modernizing” language
promoted by the Commission in the
consultation text, given that member states
10
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have other treaties with language that is more
open to abuse.
In light of past adventurous interpretations, the
MFN treatment standard should be excluded
from the treaty or limited strictly to domestic
regulatory treatment of foreign investors rather
than any treatment in another treaty.

PDF version, page 5: “The EU also includes
exceptions allowing the Parties to take
measures relating to the protection of health,
the environment, consumers, etc. Additional
carve-outs would apply to the audio-visual
sector and the granting of subsidies. These are
typically included in EU FTAs and also apply
to the non-discrimination obligations relating
to investment. Such exceptions allow
differences in treatment between investors and
investments where necessary to achieve public
policy objectives.”

Exceptions and carve-outs are an inherently
limited way to preserve regulatory flexibility.
First, they establish regulatory space as an
exception to the principle of investment
protection rather than an equal partner. Second,
they typically do not extend to all standards of
investment protection in the treaty, thus
allowing arbitrators other ways to find a
violation and award compensation. Third, they
are usually limited to a particular sector or area
of decision-making, thus exposing other
sectors and areas to all of the threats that the
exception was meant to safeguard against.
Exceptions and carve-outs are not a substitute
for a clear and unequivocal statement of the
state’s right to regulate in the treaty.

General response to Question 3: Fair and equitable treatment
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the approach to fair and equitable treatment of investors
and their investments in relation to the TTIP?
The Commission’s approach to fair and equitable treatment (FET) is extremely unfortunate and
even duplicitous. The Commission claims to have provided for a closed list in the definition of
the standard. Yet it has not adopted clear (and obvious) language to remove the arbitrators’
power to decide that the FET standard is not closed. The Commission also states its intent to
preclude FET from being used as a stabilization clause. Yet this is not stated in the Canada-EU
CETA although it would have been easy to do.
In fact, while claiming that it wants to contain the arbitrators’ expansiveness, the Commission
has expanded the scope of FET – relative to its widely-accepted customary meaning before the
arbitrators arrived on the scene about 15 years ago. The Commission appears to have insisted
that Canada move away from the NAFTA states’ well-established commitment to limiting FET
11
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to its customary meaning. Perhaps most troubling, the Commission has decided to allow the
same arbitrators who wildly expanded the meaning of FET to keep control via ambiguous
language in the Commissions’ definition.
Specific response to Question 3: Fair and equitable treatment

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 5: “The obligation to grant
foreign investors fair and equitable treatment
(FET) is one of the key investment protection
standards. It ensures that investors and
investments are protected against treatment by
the host country which, even if not
expropriatory or discriminatory, is still
unacceptable because it is arbitrary, unfair,
abusive, etc.”

The Commission avoids the troubling history
of arbitrator awards. That history reveals FET
as the most dangerous standard for taxpayers
and regulators in that it has been used by
tribunals more often than any other standard to
find a treaty violation and compensate foreign
investors. The vagueness of the standard has
allowed the arbitrators to import a wide range
of new concepts that expand the arbitrators’
power over legislatures, governments, and
courts. 5
For example, the arbitrators invented or
transplanted new and broadly-framed foreign
investor rights to regulatory stability (putting a
high price on democratic regulatory change), to
be compensated for breach of their legitimate
expectations of foreign investors (as measured
by arbitrators), and to “good faith” in their
dealings with government (another broad
concept that no doubt all of us would love to
receive). Which of these new concepts in the
Commission’s view fall within its “etc.” in the
consultation text?
The Commission should acknowledge that
FET has been abused by arbitrators under the
treaties and take unambiguous steps to address
this problem.

5

See book.
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PDF version, page 5: “The FET standard is
present in most international investment
agreements. However, in many cases the
standard is not defined, and it is usually not
limited or clarified. Inevitably, this has given
arbitral tribunals significant room for
interpretation, and the interpretations adopted
by arbitral tribunals have varied from very
narrow to very broad, leading to much
controversy about the precise meaning of the
standard. This lack of clarity has fueled a large
number of ISDS claims by investors, some of
which have raised concern with regard to the
states’ right to regulate. In particular, in some
cases, the standard has been understood to
encompass the protection of the legitimate
expectations of investors in a very broad way,
including the expectation of a stable general
legislative framework.”

It is positive that the Commission
acknowledges the history mentioned above
although it still understates the extent of the
arbitrators’ expansiveness.

PDF version, page 5: “Certain investment
agreements have narrowed down the content of
the FET standard by linking it to concepts that
are considered to be part of customary
international law, such as the minimum
standard of treatment that countries must
respect in relation to the treatment accorded to
foreigners. However, this has also resulted in a
wide range of differing arbitral tribunal
decisions on what is or is not covered by
customary international law, and has not
brought the desired greater clarity to the
definition of the standard.”

The Commission does not substantiate its
claim in the second part of this paragraph. It is
true that the attempt to link the FET standard to
international custom was far from a complete
success in containing the arbitrators. Yet the
attempt did at least put potential limits on the
meaning of FET as measured against the
widely-understood customary meaning of the
international minimum standard before the
explosion of investor-state arbitration about 15
years ago.

PDF version, page 5: “An issue sometimes
linked to the FET standard is the respect by the
host country of its legal obligations towards the
foreign investors and their investments
(sometimes referred to as an “umbrella
clause”), e.g. when the host country has
entered into a contract with the foreign
investor. Investment agreements may have
specific provisions to this effect, which have

This is a good example of how many
arbitrators have used FET to expand their
power and take investor protection well beyond
its reasonable limits. I commend the
Commission for identifying the problem.

On the other hand, the Commission does not
question the role of the arbitrators in causing
the problem or the solution of replacing them
with financially-disinterested judges. As well,
the Commission does not propose to address
other flaws in the process and structure of
investor-state arbitration. It is a missed
opportunity.

Unfortunately, as discussed below, the
Commission has not addressed the problem.
Indeed, in the Canada-EU CETA text, the

13

EU Public consultation on investor-state arbitration in TTIP – Comment – Gus Van Harten
sometimes been interpreted broadly as
implying that every breach of e.g. a contractual
obligation could constitute a breach of the
investment agreement.”

Commission is apparently pushing (over
Canada’s objections) a broad umbrella clause
that runs along the lines of what the
Commission laments here. This will invite
more adventures by arbitrators. It suggests that
the Commission is playing a double-game by
reassuring the public while burying, in the
treaty text, major concessions to arbitrator
power.

PDF version, page 6:

If the intent is to clarify the standard, why
leave the power to interpret a still-ambiguous
text in the hands of those who took the
standard too far?

“The main objective of the EU is to clarify the
standard, in particular by incorporating key
lessons learned from case-law. This would
eliminate uncertainty for both states and
investors.
Under this approach, a state could be held
responsible for a breach of the fair and
equitable treatment obligation only for
breaches of a limited set of basic rights,
namely: the denial of justice; the disregard of
the fundamental principles of due process;
manifest arbitrariness; targeted discrimination
based on gender, race or religious belief; and
abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress or
harassment.”

At best, the Commission is going half-way
with the arbitrators. It is adopting some of their
expansive interpretations – i.e. interpretations
that have gone beyond the previously-accepted
customary meaning – as “lessons learned from
case law”. This most certainly will not
“eliminate uncertainty” for states or investors.
Rather, it rejects an alternative narrower and
clearer meaning of FET.
Indeed, the FET standard is arguably
unnecessary alongside the other standards in
investment treaties that protect foreign
investors against uncompensated
expropriation, discrimination, and failure to
protect the investor’s physical security. I say
“almost” because the only necessary role of
FET in light of these other standards is to
safeguard against denial of justice in the host
country’s domestic courts. Denial of justice is
easily defined in a treaty cover situations
where a foreign investor suffers targeted
discrimination or denial of due process.
Added to the other standards of investor
protection, FET goes well beyond “a limited
set of basic rights”. It includes additional
concepts which enhance arbitrator power
dramatically to favour foreign investors. In
essence, FET allows compensation without
14
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expropriation, discrimination, or denial of
justice.

PDF version, page 6: “This list may be
extended only where the Parties (the EU and
the US) specifically agree to add such elements
to the content of the standard, for instance
where there is evidence that new elements of
the standard have emerged from international
law.”

This statement is inaccurate. It would be easy
to make clear that the relevant list is a closed
list but the Canada-EU CETA does not do so.
In that text, the relevant clause (Article
X.X(2)) omits the word “only” when compared
to the Commission’s consultation text. To
make the list closed, as described in the
consultation text, this Article would need to
include the word “only” after “A Party
breaches the obligation of fair and equitable
treatment…” and before “where a measure or
series of measures constitutes:…”. Or the
Article would need to say, for example, that
FET “includes and is limited to” the listed
elements.
These are basic points of legal drafting if the
Commission wanted to ensure the list was
closed to expansion by arbitrators. Instead, the
clause’s ambiguity allows arbitrators to infer
that the list was not intended by both states
parties to be closed. Statements to the contrary
in the consultation text are misleading.

PDF version, page 6: “The “legitimate
expectations” of the investor may be taken into
account in the interpretation of the standard.
However, this is possible only where clear,
specific representations have been made by a
Party to the agreement in order to convince the
investor to make or maintain the investment
and upon which the investor relied, and that
were subsequently not respected by that Party.
The intention is to make it clear that an
investor cannot legitimately expect that the
general regulatory and legal regime will not
change.”

This aspect of FET was invented or
transplanted by arbitrators in numerous past
cases. By including it in the Canada-EU
CETA, the Commission invites further
arbitrator expansiveness.
For example, must the state’s representations
that create legitimate expectations be in
writing? Presumably the answer is yes if the
investor is to be compensated for relying on
them. Yet this is not stated in the consultation
text or the Canada-EU CETA.
As a result, the Commission’s approach allows
undocumented oral communications between
an investor and a single official, on which there
is no reliable written evidence, to create
15
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potentially massive public liability. This has
occurred in past cases where legitimate
expectations were found based on flimsy
evidence. 6 It is a recipe not only for
misunderstanding but also possible fraud and
corruption.
It is reasonable to expect a foreign investor to
wait for written confirmation before relying on
a state’s representation. Any sophisticated
adult, let alone major company, should know
that promises should come in writing.
The broad problem with the notion of
legitimate expectations, backed by a right of
retrospective public compensation for
economic loss, is that it can frustrate or
preclude legitimate regulatory change.

PDF version, page 6: “Thus the EU intends to
ensure that the standard is not understood to be
a “stabilisation obligation”, in other words a
guarantee that the legislation of the host state
will not change in a way that might negatively
affect investors.”

6

I find it hard not to read this statement as an
attempt to mislead non-specialists. If this is the
Commission’s intent, why is it not stated
clearly and unequivocally in the treaty? It is
not stated at all in the investment chapter of the
Canada-EU CETA let alone clearly and
unequivocally.

Van Harten (2013) p gb on legitimate expectations being found on flimsy evidence.
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PDF version, page 6: “In line with the general
objective of clarifying the content of the
standard, the EU shall also strive, where
necessary, to provide protection to foreign
investors in situations in which the host state
uses its sovereign powers to avoid contractual
obligations towards foreign investors or their
investments, without however covering
ordinary contractual breaches like the nonpayment of an invoice.”

Here the Commission signals again that it
wants to expand FET beyond its accepted
customary meaning.
By implication, the Commission is making the
right to regulate less reliable than in the
NAFTA context where Canada, the U.S., and
Mexico have sought to check the arbitrators’
approach by requiring a link to international
custom based on evidence of state practice and
opinio juris.
This indicates that the Commission wants to
expand investment protection yet further at the
expense of the reliability of the right to
regulate.

General response to Question 4: Expropriation
Question: [W]hat is your opinion of the approach to dealing with expropriation in relation to the
TTIP? Please explain.
Drawing on the post-2001 practice of the U.S. and Canada, the Commission has included useful
language on indirect expropriation (see Canada-EU CETA, Article X (Annex)). However, as an
attempt to protect the right to regulate, this approach is flawed because: (a) it does not apply to
other standards in the treaty; (b) it contains qualifiers that allow the arbitrators to retain an
unduly expansive approach; (c) it is open to a significant loophole due to the Commission’s
approach to MFN treatment; and (d) it keeps power in the hands of arbitrators, instead of judges,
who in many past awards have demonstrated themselves unsuited for ensuring a balanced
approach to indirect expropriation and other concepts.
The Commission’s reform on this issue thus falls well short of an effective safeguard for the
right to regulate.
Specific response to Question 4: Expropriation

Statements in the consultation text

PDF version, page 6: “The right to property is
a human right, enshrined in the European
Convention of Human Rights, in the European

Comments

The Commission’s reference to the right to
property, enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights, is telling. The
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Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as in
the legal tradition of EU Member States. This
right is crucial to investors and investments.
Indeed, the greatest risk that investors may
incur in a foreign country is the risk of having
their investment expropriated without
compensation. This is why the guarantees
against expropriation are placed at the core of
any international investment agreement.”

relevant right is in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of
the Convention. This Article has two parts, the
second of which affirms the state’s right to
regulate alongside the protection of property:
“The preceding provisions [on property
protection] shall not, however, in any
way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or
to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
Yet this aspect of the human right to property –
or a similar affirmation of the right to regulate
– is missing from the Canada-EU CETA and
other European investment treaties.
This reveals how treaties like CETA and TTIP
revise the existing human rights framework
and the balance between property rights and
the state’s right to regulate (including to
promote and protect other human rights).

PDF version, page 7: “Direct expropriations,
which entail the outright seizure of a property
right, do not occur often nowadays and usually
do not generate controversy in arbitral practice.
However, arbitral tribunals are confronted with
a much more difficult task when it comes to
assessing whether a regulatory measure of a
state, which does not entail the direct transfer
of the property right, might be considered
equivalent to expropriation (indirect
expropriation).”

The question of what qualifies as indirect
expropriation is critical in any legal system,
that involves far-reaching power to decide
when the state’s sovereign activity requires
public compensation for an affected actor.
The Commission understates the arbitrators’
record of expansiveness on this point. An
example on this issue is the very broad
statement by the early NAFTA tribunal in
Metalclad which is one of the most frequently
cited awards in investment treaty arbitration:
“Thus, expropriation… includes…
covert or incidental interference with
the use of property which has the effect
of depriving the owner, in whole or
significant part, of the use or
reasonably to be expected economic
benefit of property even if not
18
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necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host State.” 7
This statement was characterized as extremely
broad by a Canadian court:
“The Tribunal gave an extremely broad
definition of expropriation…. This
definition is sufficiently broad to
include a legitimate rezoning by a
municipality or other zoning authority.
However the definition of expropriation
is a question of law with which this
Court is not entitled to interfere….” 8
However, the reviewing court in Metalclad
could not interfere with the tribunal’s approach
due to the limited role of judicial review in
investment treaty arbitration (in Metalclad,
limited judicial review took place under the
UNCITRAL Rules and related implementing
legislation in Canada; the ICSID Rules do not
allow for any judicial supervision of awards
but rather for limited review by three World
Bank-appointed arbitrators).

PDF version, page 7: “Indirect expropriation
has been a source of concern in certain cases
where regulatory measures taken for legitimate
purposes have been subject to investor claims
for compensation, on the grounds that such
measures were equivalent to expropriation
because of their significant negative impact on
investment. Most investment agreements do
not provide details or guidance in this respect,
which has inevitably left arbitral tribunals with
significant room for interpretation.”

7
8

The Commission mentions the unsurprising
tendency of foreign investors to support an
expansive approach to indirect expropriation.
However, the Commission does not mention
the arbitrators’ expansive record on this point.
With a research assistant, I coded all awards in
known cases to May-June 2010 to assess
whether the arbitrators took an expansive
approach to the concept of indirect
expropriation (a) by focusing exclusively or
primarily on the effect of a state decision on
the investor and putting aside other relevant
factors such as the purpose of a nondiscriminatory general measure, (b) by finding
an expropriation where there was merely a
“significant” or “substantial” effect on the

Metalclad v Mexico (Award of 30 August 2000, NAFTA) para 103.
United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664 (2 May 2001) para 99.
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investor, or (c) by severing the investor’s
economic interest into segments thus elevating
the degree of impact of the measure.
We found that in 72.5% of 120 resolutions (per
arbitrator) of this issue as either expansive or
restrictive, the arbitrators took an expansive
approach. Thus, the usual approach was to
resolve the ambiguity in favour of a less
reliable right to regulate. This tendency toward
expansiveness was observed in general across
14 jurisdictional and substantive issues. 9

PDF version, page 7: “The objective of the EU
is to clarify the provisions on expropriation and
to provide interpretative guidance with regard
to indirect expropriation in order to avoid
claims against legitimate public policy
measures. The EU wants to make it clear that
non-discriminatory measures taken for
legitimate public purposes, such as to protect
health or the environment, cannot be
considered equivalent to an expropriation,
unless they are manifestly excessive in light of
their purpose. The EU also wants to clarify that
the simple fact that a measure has an impact on
the economic value of the investment does not
justify a claim that an indirect expropriation
has occurred.”

The Commission again leaves the keys with
those who crashed the car. Besides clarifying
the text, arbitrators need to be replaced with
financially-disinterested judges. Otherwise, the
resolution of the inevitable trade-offs between
investment protection and the right to regulate
is stacked in favour of the former.
In addition, the Commission’s textual
clarifications on indirect expropriation have
important limitations. First, they are vulnerable
to the MFN loophole, outlined above, because
virtually all European states have treaties with
third-states that do not contain the limiting
language on indirect expropriation. To address
this, the Commission would need to remove
MFN treatment from the treaty or state clearly
and unequivocally that MFN treatment is
limited to domestic regulatory treatment of
investors and does not extend to treatment in
another treaty.
Second, the clarifying language on indirect
expropriation has qualifiers that allow
arbitrators to continue their expansive
approach.
Third, to be effective, the clarifications on
indirect expropriation would need to apply to
all standards in the treaty. Otherwise, a tribunal

9

Van Harten (2012) gb; Van Harten (2013) gb.
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can avoid the language by finding a violation
of another standard (most likely FET). In one
past case, an arbitrator said in his reasons that
the tribunal should find a violation of FET
instead of indirect expropriation because this
allowed the tribunal to reach the same outcome
while avoiding political controversy. 10

General response to Question 5: Ensuring the right to regulate and investment protection
Question: [W]hat is your opinion with regard to the way the right to regulate is dealt with in the
EU's approach to TTIP?
The Commission does not mention the contradiction between investor-state arbitration and
human rights protection. In turn, its approach to investor-state arbitration endorses an elevation
of property rights over both the right to regulate and other human rights.
In the CETA text, the right to regulate has not been affirmed clearly and unequivocally (it
appears not to be mentioned in the investment chapter). For a meaningful balance between
investment protection and the right to regulate – including to promote and protect human rights –
the treaty would require a clear and unqualified affirmation of the right alongside the many
elaborate rights for investors and responsibilities for states. The Commission’s only “procedural
improvement” on the right to regulate actually intensifies the pressure on states to change their
decisions in order to appease arbitrator power and avoid financial liability.
The Commission continues to give for-profit arbitrators, who have an exceptional financial
interest to favour prospective claimants (i.e. foreign investors, especially deep-pocketed
companies), the power to interpret and apply virtually all treaty provisions. States cannot initiate
claims under the Canada-EU CETA or other investment treaties and are for this reason not the
“customers” of the arbitration industry. As discussed above, the Commission downplays the role
of arbitrator power and its control over public money by inflating the usefulness of its textual
clarifications.
The Commission should acknowledge that arbitrator decisions are “only as good” as the process
by which arbitrators are appointed and make their decisions. The lack of institutional
independence and procedural fairness in investor-state arbitration – which the Commission
leaves untouched – means that all outcomes of investor-state arbitration under the CETA or TTIP
would lack integrity regardless of the underlying text.
10

SD Myers v Canada (Schwartz separate opinion, 12 November 2000) para. 222 (where the arbitrator
commented that the tribunal should find a violation of the NAFTA minimum standard, instead of the
NAFTA expropriation standard, because ‘it makes no practical difference to [the claimant] whether the
expropriation label is attached’ and ‘seems unlikely that the measure of damages would be any greater’;
on the other hand, ‘a finding of expropriation might contribute to public misunderstanding and anxiety
about both this decision and the wider implications of the investment chapter of NAFTA’).
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Specific response to Question 5: Ensuring the right to regulate and investment protection

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 7-8: “In democratic
societies, the right to regulate of states is
subject to principles and rules contained in
both domestic legislation and in international
law. For instance, in the European Convention
on Human Rights, the Contracting States
commit themselves to guarantee a number of
civil and political rights. In the EU, the
Constitutions of the Member States, as well as
EU law, ensure that the actions of the state
cannot go against fundamental rights of the
citizens. Hence, public regulation must be
based on a legitimate purpose and be necessary
in a democratic society.”

There are two major problems with this
statement. First, there is a stark contrast
between the Commission’s handling of the
right to regulate in the Canada-EU CETA and
the handling of property rights and the right to
regulate in the European Convention of Human
Rights, as noted under Question 4 above.
Second, investor-state arbitration contradicts a
basic principle of human rights in democratic
societies: one actor should not be discriminated
against inappropriately to favour another. By
definition, investor-state arbitration
discriminates in favour of foreign asset owners
and against other persons whose rights may be
affected by state decisions (including decisions
concerning the regulation and conduct of
foreign investors). Unlike foreign investors, all
other rights-holders are limited to human rights
adjudication in domestic and regional
institutions to protect their property and other
rights. Indeed, the presumption of the CETA is
that these other institutions are so inadequate –
albeit for foreign investors only – that even the
usual duty to exhaust reasonable-available
domestic remedies should never apply!
This creates major advantages for foreign
investors. Their special access to investor-state
arbitration allows them, among other things,
(a) much more widely enforceable awards than
in human rights adjudication; (b) the potential
for vastly more public compensation – to date,
billions of dollars – than in human rights
adjudication; (c) the ability to call on standards
of protection that are not balanced by
countervailing features of human rights
adjudication including a clear statement of the
state’s right to regulate or of the need to
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balance investment protection against human
rights; (d) the power, unlike human rights
complainants, to play a direct role in the makeup of the tribunal; and (e) a decision-making
process in which the adjudicator has an
apparent interest to favour claimants (i.e.
foreign investors, especially deep-pocketed
companies), assuming that arbitrators who
want to be re-appointed may encourage claims
in order to support the arbitration industry.
The Commission does not acknowledge this
basic conflict between investor-state arbitration
and human rights. Instead, it accepts
unjustified discrimination in favour of foreign
investors by granting them special substantive
and procedural rights and by giving arbitrators
the power to put investor rights and interests
ahead of those of other actors and ahead of the
public interest.
An example illustrates the problem. In the era
of investor-state arbitration, if a foreign
national were tortured by state officials, he or
she would be able to bring an international
claim against the state – without having to
resort first to domestic courts, where
reasonably-available – only if he or she owned
assets in the state and only to the extent that
the torture affected his or her position as an
asset owner.
On the other hand, if a foreign investor’s
officials were to torture their domestic
employees with the collaboration of the state,
the employees could not bring an international
claim against the company or its officers, and
could bring a claim against the state for failing
to protect them only after resorting first to
domestic remedies. This is an absurd elevation
in law of foreign investors over everyone else.
The Commission’s approach entrenches and
expands it.

PDF version, page 8: “Investment agreements

Instead of acknowledging the contradiction
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reflect this perspective. Nevertheless, wherever
such agreements contain provisions that appear
to be very broad or ambiguous, there is always
a risk that the arbitral tribunals interpret them
in a manner which may be perceived as a threat
to the state's right to regulate. In the end, the
decisions of arbitral tribunals are only as good
as the provisions that they have to interpret and
apply.”

between investor-state arbitration and human
rights, the Commission returns to the weak
option of textual clarifications. In the last
sentence of this statement, the Commission
downplays the past role of the arbitrators in
exploiting treaty ambiguity to expand their
power and undermine the right to regulate. The
Commission’s textual clarifications always
leave behind a degree of ambiguity.
A more accurate statement would be that the
arbitrators’ decisions are “only as good” as the
process by which they are appointed and make
decisions. The lack of institutionalized
independence and procedural fairness in
investor-state arbitration means that all
outcomes of investor-state arbitration lack
integrity regardless of the underlying text on
substantive provisions.

PDF version, page 8:

As discussed above, the Commission does not
affirm, clearly and unequivocally, the right to
“The objective of the EU is to achieve a solid
regulate. As a result, the Commission has not
balance between the protection of investors and balanced that right with the elaborate rights of
the Parties’ right to regulate.
foreign investors and the corresponding
responsibilities of states.
First of all, the EU wants to make sure that the
Parties’ right to regulate is confirmed as a basic It is not enough for the Commission to declare
underlying principle. This is important, as
its intent to balance or confirm the right to
arbitral tribunals will have to take this principle regulate in a consultation text, in the treaty’s
into account when assessing any dispute
preamble, or in a substantive provision that has
settlement case.”
major qualifications such as a circular clause
providing that the right to regulate is protected
so long as it is exercised consistently with the
treaty. Indeed, mention of the right to regulate
in these contexts is harmful because it supports
an inference that the states parties intended not
to make the right to regulate clearly applicable
and effective alongside the treaty’s rights for
foreign investors.

PDF version, page 8: “Secondly, the EU will
introduce clear and innovative provisions with
regard to investment protection standards that

This is not credible. The FET and indirect
expropriation provisions in the Canada-EU
CETA were discussed under Questions 3 and 4
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have raised concern in the past (for instance,
the standard of fair and equitable treatment is
defined based on a closed list of basic rights;
the annex on expropriation clarifies that nondiscriminatory measures for legitimate public
policy objectives do not constitute indirect
expropriation). These improvements will
ensure that investment protection standards
cannot be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a
way that is detrimental to the right to regulate.”

above. To reiterate, they are vulnerable to the
MFN loophole, have unacceptable qualifiers,
are broader (in the case of FET) than
comparable standards in other treaties
including NAFTA, and are left to the
discretion of arbitrators instead of judges.
There is no way to “ensure” that the treaty
“cannot be interpreted” by anyone in a way
that harms the right to regulate. However, the
Commission could at least remove the
unacceptable financial interests of the
adjudicator in this respect.

PDF version, page 8-9: “Third, the EU will
ensure that all the necessary safeguards and
exceptions are in place. For instance, foreign
investors should be able to establish in the EU
only under the terms and conditions defined by
the EU. A list of horizontal exceptions will
apply to non-discrimination obligations, in
relation to measures such as those taken in the
field of environmental protection, consumer
protection or health (see question 2 for details).
Additional carve-outs would apply to the
audiovisual sector and the granting of
subsidies. Decisions on competition matters
will not be subject to investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS). Furthermore, in line with
other EU agreements, nothing in the agreement
would prevent a Party from taking measures
for prudential reasons, including measures for
the protection of depositors or measures to
ensure the integrity and stability of its financial
system. In addition, EU agreements contain
general exceptions applying in situations of
crisis, such as in circumstances of serious
difficulties for the operation of the exchange
rate policy or monetary policy, balance of
payments or external financial difficulties, or
threat thereof.”

The reliance on exceptions and carve-outs to
safeguard the right to regulate gives that right
an inferior legal status to foreign investors’
rights and protections. The general principle of
the treaty is one of investment protection
unless the state can make an exceptional case
for the right to regulate. This is prioritizing not
balancing.

PDF version, page 9: “In terms of the
procedural aspects relating to ISDS, the
objective of the EU is to build a system

An express mechanism for agreed
interpretations by the states parties is not new.
It has been part of NAFTA for 20 years. In that

Exceptions or reservations also have other
limitations. Usually they apply only to some
substantive provisions in the treaty or only to
particular sectors or areas of decision-making.
For example, why do “competition matters”
but not, for example, public health matters call
for exemption from investor-state arbitration?
Put differently, why does investor-state
arbitration present an unacceptable threat to the
right to regulate in competition but not in other
areas of regulation?
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capable of adapting to the states' right to
regulate. Wherever greater clarity and
precision proves necessary in order to protect
the right to regulate, the Parties will have the
possibility to adopt interpretations of the
investment protection provisions which will be
binding on arbitral tribunals. This will allow
the Parties to oversee how the agreement is
interpreted in practice and, where necessary, to
influence the interpretation.”

context, the mechanism has been used twice,
and only once to reign in expansive approaches
to a substantive standard. Further, the option to
issue subsequent agreements about the
meaning of a treaty is available generally to all
states as a matter of treaty law. To my
knowledge, outside NAFTA, it never been
used successfully in investor-state arbitration.

PDF version, page 9: “The procedural
improvements proposed by the EU will also
make it clear that an arbitral tribunal will not
be able to order the repeal of a measure, but
only compensation for the investor.”

This is not new and should not be described as
a “procedural improvement”.

Overall, this mechanism of shared
interpretation is a rarely-used and bureaucratic
process that requires the consent of all states
parties. In the cat-and-mouse game between
states and arbitrators, it is a lumbering way to
react to arbitrator frolics. For-profit arbitrators
should not have the power to interpret the
treaties and re-direct public funds in the first
place.

In investor-state arbitration, the primary
remedy is monetary compensation; i.e., a
backward-looking damages award to the
investor. This distinguishes investor-state
arbitration from courts, where the primary
remedy for unlawful sovereign conduct is
usually non-monetary (partly to protect the
fiscal powers of legislative and executive
actors). It also distinguishes investor-state
arbitration from the World Trade Organization
(WTO) where, if a state is found to have
violated the agreement, the state has an
opportunity to correct the illegality before
facing an economic remedy.
Thus, the Commission’s approach avoids the
key problem that, in the face of uncertain but
potentially costly liability, states may pull back
from important decisions when threatened with
an investor-state claim, especially if the
investor is a deep-pocketed company and large
amounts are at stake.
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The Commission’s main innovation in this
context of regulatory chill (sometimes called
“good governance”), is to instruct tribunals
when calculating damages to take into account
“any repeal or modification” of the state’s
original decision (see CETA Article x-36(3),
which the Commission did not include among
the CETA excerpts in its consultation text).
I have not seen a clause like this before in an
investment treaty. In effect, it institutionalizes
the pressure for a state to change its decisions
in favour of foreign investors. Thus, it expands
the advantages given to foreign investors in
their relations with the state relative to anyone
who would benefit if the state’s decision was
not changed.

Response to the Commission’s Introduction to Questions 6 to 12 (investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS))
Throughout this comment, I refer to “investor-state arbitration” or “investment treaty arbitration”
instead of “investor-state dispute settlement”. This is because the latter term downplays the key
role of arbitration – in contrast to mediation or negotiation/ settlement under threat of arbitration
– as the key compulsory and binding element of investment treaties.

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 9: “Investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) is a legal instrument that
allows investors to bring a claim before an
arbitration tribunal that the host state has not
respected the investment protection rules under
TTIP. Domestic remedies would be preferable,
but TTIP provisions cannot be invoked directly
in front of a national court.”

This is a dubious justification for investor-state
arbitration. In many countries, treaties in
general are often not directly applicable in
domestic law. Yet this does not support the use
of investor-state arbitration, to protect foreign
investors alone, in situations where (a)
domestic law nonetheless ensures sufficient
protection and (b) domestic courts offer justice
and are reasonably-available. This is discussed
further below.

PDF version, page 9: “Despite the general
solidity of developed court systems such as the

If the concern is that a foreign investor may
sometimes not have effective access to justice
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US and the EU, it is possible that investors will
not be given effective access to justice, e.g. if
they are denied access to appeal or due
process, leaving them without any effective
legal remedy. ISDS is therefore necessary to
allow legitimate claims to be pursued. In such
cases, the investors would have to prove that
the measures have breached the investment
protection provisions and that it caused them
damage.”

in the U.S. or EU, the solution is to allow an
international claim only in such cases. Yet the
Commission plans to allow investor-state
arbitration without any obligation at all for a
foreign investor to resort to reasonablyavailable domestic remedies.

PDF version, page 9: “The possibility for
investors to resort to ISDS is a standard feature
of virtually all the 3000 investment agreements
in existence today, including the 1400 signed
by EU Member States. Most of these
agreements contain a standard paragraph
stating that investors can to go to ISDS in case
of a breach of the investment protection
provisions.”

Proponents of investor-state arbitration often
refer to the figure of about 3000 existing
treaties that provide for investor-state
arbitration to support the case for more such
treaties.

In effect, this implies that domestic courts do
not offer effective access to justice in all cases,
everywhere, in the U.S. and EU. It is ridiculous
to claim that this is so in the absence of any
systematic evidence that domestic courts in the
U.S. or EU fail to offer justice to foreign
investors.

First, the figure is not as large as it seems. To
match the legal effect of a multilateral
agreement on investment, for example, one
would need over 19,000 bilateral investment
treaties (196 countries * 195 countries / 2). On
this measure, 3000 treaties is about 16% of
potential coverage.
Second, most existing treaties do not govern
significant investment flows and appear
unlikely to lead to claims. Over half of known
cases (129 of 249) to May-June 2010 arose
under NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty, and
just 15 bilateral investment treaties of the
U.S. 11
Third, investor-state arbitration based on
existing treaties (not including potential forumshopping via shell companies) covers only a

11

This includes 61 cases under NAFTA, 24 cases under the Energy Charter Treaty, and 44 cases under
U.S. BITs with Argentina, Zaire, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, and Ukraine. The dataset
consisted of all 249 known cases that had led to a publicly-available award on jurisdiction (or, for
NAFTA cases, a notice of intent to arbitrate) as of cut-offs during May-June 2010.
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minority of international FDI flows. For
example, investment-state arbitration covered
15-20% of inward and outward FDI flows for
the U.S. in 2012. The TTIP would cover an
additional 50-60% of those FDI flows. 12
A few treaties now pursued by the Commission
or the U.S. – the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
EU-China, and U.S.-China – would expand
coverage of investor-state arbitration
dramatically (to over 80% of international FDI
flows based on U.S. flows as a proxy). Thus,
one or two new treaties, especially TTIP,
would expand arbitrator power by far more
than all existing treaties combined.
Overall, it lacks credibility to justify a major
new treaty providing for investor-state
arbitration – especially in the relatively
untouched domain of investment relations
among developed countries – by referring to
many relatively-inconsequential existing
treaties.

PDF version, page 9-10: “The agreements
themselves do not contain any precise
procedural framework for how an ISDS case
should be handled by a tribunal. The ISDS
tribunal must work on the basis of international
arbitration rules that set a general procedural
framework. The most common are the rules of
the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”, a World Bank
body) or those of the United Nations
Commission for International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”). However, these rules only
partially address the problems which have
come to light over the last years with the ISDS

This is an incomplete statement of the
procedural and institutional problems that
follow from the use of for-profit arbitration to
resolve, on a final basis, some of the most
profound questions of public law and public
policy. The statement does not mention (a) the
lack of institutional safeguards of judicial
independence in investor-state arbitration, (b)
the lack of procedural fairness due to the
selective and arbitrary approach to full
standing rights, (c) the inappropriate role of
retrospective public compensation as a remedy,
and (d) the essential imbalance both between
investor rights and investor responsibilities (the

12

These approximate figures were calculated based on existing investment treaty coverage of country-bycountry inward and outward FDI flows for the U.S. in 2012 from the data provided in Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “StatExtracts: FDI flows by partner country”,
available online: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER. The figures do
not account for the possibility of forum-shopping by foreign investors which is difficult to measure, and
handled in different ways by arbitrators and existing treaties, but may expand existing coverage of
investor-state arbitration by a significant proportion.
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system, notably on transparency, the conduct
of arbitrators and the absence of any appeal
mechanism.”

treaties institute the former not the latter) and
between state rights and state responsibilities
(the treaties institute the latter not the former).

PDF version, page 10: “The EU is working to
develop an efficient and modern ISDS
mechanism which is equipped to deal with
these problems. The EU will improve the ISDS
mechanism under TTIP compared to existing
investment agreements. The improvements are
explained in the questions that follow where
we ask you to comment and make suggestions.
Through these improvements, the EU aims to
ensure a transparent, accountable and wellfunctioning ISDS system that reflects the
public interest and policy objectives.”

The “improvements” discussed by the
Commission – other than on transparency – are
minor and sometimes detrimental, as I discuss
below.

PDF version, page 10: “The EU will
encourage the amicable settlement of disputes,
through a required period for consultations,
and the possibility of mediation.”

As discussed below, the settlement of an
investor-state dispute, whether or not based on
formal mediation, lacks integrity where a party
agrees to settlement under the threat of an
arbitration process that itself lacks integrity.
Investor-state arbitration lacks integrity
because it is not institutionally independent,
procedurally fair, open to the public, and
balanced in the allocation of rights and
responsibilities.

PDF version, page 10: “The EU also aims to
enhance consistency of rulings, including by
the establishment of an appeal mechanism and
by allowing for the governments to provide
guidance and interpretation so that their
intentions are respected. A further
consideration is how to avoid frivolous or
unfounded claims; the EU will introduce
mechanisms to allow for a quick dismissal of
such claims. Transparency and the possibility
for stakeholders to make their views heard in
the process underpin these improvements and
are essential for an accountable and credible

Other than for transparency, none of the
Commission’s reforms would make a
meaningful difference to the lack of
independence, fairness, and balance in
investor-state arbitration. On transparency, the
Commission’s reforms are positive with room
for improvement.

In its last sentence, the Commission does not
refer to the fundamental adjudicative values of
independence, including at an institutional
level, and procedural fairness. The failure to
discuss these values helps the Commission to
sidestep the importance of replacing arbitrators
with judges and of allowing all parties whose
rights or interests are affected to have full
standing in the adjudicative process.
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ISDS system.”

General response to Question 6: Transparency in ISDS
Question: [P]lease provide your views on whether [the Commission’s] approach contributes to
the objective of the EU to increase transparency and openness in the ISDS system for TTIP.
Please indicate any additional suggestions you may have.
The Commission’s approach to transparency is positive. Some Western European countries have
been opponents of transparency in investor-state arbitration for reasons that seemed hypocritical
and short-sighted. It is positive that the European Commission has chosen to defend the principle
of openness in adjudication where the adjudication affects interests of third parties and the
public.
To elaborate, in investor-state arbitration, the arbitrators have the power to decide finally what a
sovereign may do lawfully in its legislative, executive, or judicial role and, in turn, what should
happen where the sovereign is found to have acted unlawfully. These are among the highest
powers of any adjudicator. Clearly, they should be a matter of public record for reasons of
accountability, independence, and fairness.
On the other hand, there are limitations to the Commission’s process to ensure transparency.
Most importantly, it leaves to arbitrators not judges the decision whether documents or hearings
should be public. This is a problem because, among other things, all arbitrators may view
claimants – i.e. foreign investors, especially deep-pocketed companies – at some level as their
customers and because claimants may oppose public access for self-serving reasons.
The Commission alludes briefly to, but does not address, the lack of procedural fairness in
investment treaty arbitration. The lack of fairness arises most clearly because anyone – other
than the claimant investor and respondent national government – whose rights or interests are
affected by the adjudication is not permitted to have full standing in the process. The
Commission’s reference to an ability for civil society actors to “file submissions” at the
discretion of the arbitrators is clearly insufficient to address this concern.
Specific response to Question 6: Transparency in ISDS

Statements in the consultation text

PDF version, page 10:
“In most ISDS cases, no or little information is
made available to the public, hearings are not
open and third parties are not allowed to

Comments

This is a very good statement of the current
inadequacies and essential role of transparency
in investor-state arbitration. Yet it also
highlights the problem that, even when an
investment treaty award must be made public,
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intervene in the proceedings. This makes it
difficult for the public to know the basic facts
and to evaluate the claims being brought by
either side.

it is possible for claims to be brought, tribunals
established, and settlements reached (entailing
payment of public money and regulatory chill)
without public knowledge.

This lack of openness has given rise to concern
and confusion with regard to the causes and
potential outcomes of ISDS disputes.
Transparency is essential to ensure the
legitimacy and accountability of the system. It
enables stakeholders interested in a dispute to
be informed and contribute to the proceedings.
It fosters accountability in arbitrators, as their
decisions are open to scrutiny. It contributes to
consistency and predictability as it helps create
a body of cases and information that can be
relied on by investors, stakeholders, states and
ISDS tribunals.

Despite its positive approach on transparency,
the Commission does not address this problem.
The Commission should make clear in the
treaty that the fact and terms of any settlement
reached by a state, following the invocation of
the treaty by a foreign investor in any verbal or
written communications with the government,
will be public. The Commission should also
ensure that all documents, including evidence
submitted to the tribunal, will be public.
Vitally, any non-disclosure of documents or
closure of hearings should be permitted only
after a judicial process.

Under the rules that apply in most existing
agreements, both the responding state and the
investor need to agree to permit the publication
of submissions. If either the investor or the
responding state does not agree to publication,
documents cannot be made public. As a result,
most ISDS cases take place behind closed
doors and no or a limited number of documents
are made available to the public.”

PDF version, page 11: “The EU's aim is to
ensure transparency and openness in the ISDS
system under TTIP. The EU will include
provisions to guarantee that hearings are open
and that all documents are available to the
public. In ISDS cases brought under TTIP, all
documents will be publicly available (subject
only to the protection of confidential
information and business secrets) and hearings
will be open to the public.”

In essence, the Commission has adopted the
transparency reforms of the NAFTA states
after early NAFTA tribunals did not permit
openness in the face of ambiguous treaty
language on this point.
That said, there are limitations to the
Commission’s approach. Most importantly, it
still allows arbitrators instead of judges to
decide whether to allow documents and
hearings to be public. This is a problem among
other things because, in a one-way system of
arbitration, all the arbitrators may at some level
view claimants as their “customers” and
because claimants have sometimes opposed
public access to documents or hearings for
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self-serving reasons.
Lastly, the Commission needs to make clear
the presumption that all evidence submitted to
the arbitrators is public.

PDF version, page 11: Interested parties from
civil society will be able to file submissions to
make their views and arguments known to the
ISDS tribunal.”

This reform falls well short of ensuring
procedural fairness in the arbitration.
There are many reasons why investor-state
arbitration may be said to be unfair. The most
precise one is that the system denies parties
whose rights or interests (including
reputational interests) are affected by the
adjudication – such as a local government
alleged to have done wrong or a private party
alleged to be corrupt – the right to full standing
in the process so that their evidence and
arguments can be heard.
The Commission’s statement refers to a
mechanism by which parties other than the
claimant investor and respondent government
will be able, at the arbitrators’ discretion, to
apply for a limited right “to file submissions”
to a tribunal. This does not address the lack of
procedural fairness in the system. For a fair
process, any party whose rights or interests are
affected by the adjudication must have a right
to full standing to the extent of the party’s
interest.

PDF version, page 11: “The EU took a leading
role in establishing new United Nations rules
on transparency in ISDS. The objective of
transparency will be achieved by incorporating
these rules into TTIP.”

As an aside, the new UNCITRAL rules on
transparency unfortunately apply only to
claims under treaties that were concluded after
the UNCITRAL transparency rules came into
effect. This approach differs from other
amendments to arbitration rules, such as the
ICC Rules, which after their amendment
applied presumptively to all new claims under
existing treaties, contracts, or other instruments
that allowed for claims under the ICC Rules.
The same principle should have applied to the
new UNCITRAL transparency rules.
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My understanding is that members of the
arbitration industry played a role in promoting
this unfortunate outcome, including while
acting as representatives of governments at
relevant UNCITRAL meetings. In light of this
history, I suggest that European institutions
should commit to making public any internal
or external lobbying role played by members
of the arbitration industry in the Commission’s
work on investor-state arbitration.

General response to Question 7: Multiple claims and relationship to domestic courts
Question: Please provide your views on the effectiveness of [the Commission’s] approach for
balancing access to ISDS with possible recourse to domestic courts and for avoiding conflicts
between domestic remedies and ISDS in relation to the TTIP. Please indicate any further steps
that can be taken. Please provide comments on the usefulness of mediation as a means to settle
disputes.
The Commission has not taken obvious steps to “favour” domestic courts despite its statement to
the contrary in the consultation text. The Commission’s approach also does not address the
widespread issue of investor-state arbitrators refusing to stay their proceedings in the face of a
parallel proceeding in domestic courts, another international forum, or a contractually-agreed
forum. This leads to waste of resources on parallel litigation and to conflicting decisions. It also
contradicts principles of party autonomy, sanctity of contract and the avoidance of parallel
proceedings.
The Commission could easily address the concern. It could require foreign investors, before an
international claim can be brought, to exhaust remedies in domestic courts where they offer
justice and are reasonably-available. It could direct investment treaty arbitrators to stay their
proceedings where a parallel claim has been or could be brought in a contractually-agreed forum
or another international forum, where the dispute is factually connected to the other forum, and
where the foreign investor or a closely related party is or could be a claimant in the other forum.
The Commission could also address the arbitrators’ creative interpretations that have facilitated
parallel treaty proceedings in factually-similar disputes. 13 Lastly, the Commission could replace
the arbitrators with judges in order to remove the adjudicator’s financial interest in allowing
parallel treaty claims.
Mediation under investment treaties takes place under the threat of investor-state arbitration.
That is, the state’s agreement to mediate is premised on the threat or fact of an arbitration claim.
In turn, the lack of independence and fairness in investor-state arbitration taints the integrity of a
13

Van Harten (2013) p gb – creative interpretations.
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mediation or settlement in the shadow of investor-state arbitration. For these reasons, mediation
and settlements in this context are not “useful”, other than for those who already benefit from
investor-state arbitration.
Specific response to Question 7: Multiple claims and relationship to domestic courts

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 11: “Investors who
consider that they have grounds to complain
about action taken by the authorities (e.g.
discrimination or lack of compensation after
expropriation) often have different options.
They may be able to go to domestic courts and
seek redress there. They or any related
companies may be able to go to other
international tribunals under other international
investment treaties.”

Arbitrators commonly allow treaty claims by
foreign investors that run parallel to other
forums including domestic courts, treaty-based
forms, and contractually-agreed forums.

PDF version, page 11: “It is often the case that
protection offered in investment agreements
cannot be invoked before domestic courts and
the applicable legal rules are different. For
example, discrimination in favour of local
companies is not prohibited under US law but
is prohibited in investment agreements. There
are also concerns that, in some cases domestic
courts may favour the local government over
the foreign investor e.g. when assessing a
claim for compensation for expropriation or
may deny due process rights such as the
effective possibility to appeal. Governments
may have immunity from being sued.”

This is a weak argument for investor-state
arbitration in the absence of a duty to exhaust
domestic remedies.

The Commission has done virtually nothing to
address this problem. As a result, it has left in
place the risk of wasteful litigation and
conflicting decisions. The Commission has
also endorsed the arbitrators’ rejection of
important principles such as party autonomy,
sanctity of contract, and the avoidance of
parallel proceedings.

For one, investment-state arbitration is not
justified by the general fact that in many
countries a treaty cannot be invoked directly
before domestic courts (without implementing
legislation to incorporate the treaty into
domestic law) or that legal rules differ between
domestic law and treaty law or among
domestic legal systems. These are basic
characteristics of the existence of states and the
distinction between the domestic and
international legal spheres. They do not
themselves justify giving a foreign investor the
special right to bring international claims
without going first to domestic courts, where
the courts offer justice and are reasonablyavailable.
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Subject to the duty to exhaust local remedies, a
foreign investor anywhere – who has suffered
from inappropriate discrimination,
expropriation without compensation, an unfair
process, or an inability to enforce a judicial
order (and who did not receive full protection
in domestic courts) – could bring a treaty claim
based on denial of justice. Put differently, all
of the concerns identified by the Commission
can be addressed without assuming that
domestic courts everywhere are systematically
unable to protect foreign investors.
The Commission offers no evidence or
rationale to support allowing foreign investors
to avoid domestic courts in all situations.
Investor-state arbitration is an over-reaction –
putting it mildly – to general concerns that
arise in all countries for everyone from the
inapplicability of international rules or
inevitable differences in domestic legal rules.

PDF version, page 11: “In addition, the
remedies are often different. In some cases
government measures can be reversed by
domestic courts, for example if they are illegal
or unconstitutional. ISDS tribunals cannot
order governments to reverse measures.”

As discussed under Question 5 above, this
statement highlights how the primary remedy
in investor-state arbitration – a retrospective
award for potentially vast amounts of public
money– creates problems for the right to
regulate. For good reason, domestic and
international courts are cautious about
awarding large amounts of monetary
compensation for past decisions of a
legislature, government, or court that are later
found to be unlawful.
For example, the Commission and European
member states expressed this concern in ECJ
proceedings on a related issue of state liability
in European Community law: 14
“If questions of interpretation are
shrouded in uncertainty and a Member
State exercises its discretion in a

14

Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany; Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and
Others (No 46 & 48/93), Report for the Hearing, [1996] ECR I-1034, (1996) 1 CML Rev 889, para 57
[here reproducing a statement by the Commission and by the Danish and UK governments].
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reasonable way, it would seem
unreasonable for it to incur liability if it
is later held that Community law
precludes the national law or
administrative practice in question.
Unblameworthy legal mistakes should
not lead to liability to make reparation.”

PDF version, page 12: “Existing investment
agreements generally do not regulate or
address the relationship with domestic courts
or other ISDS tribunals. Some agreements
require that the investor choses between
domestic courts and ISDS tribunals. This is
often referred to as ‘fork in the road’ clause.”

The Commission’s model, as reflected by the
CETA, does not include a fork-in-the-road
clause. This is discussed further below.
Incidentally, arbitrators have in most cases not
given effect to fork-in-the-road clauses. This is
another example of why it is a bad idea to
continue to rely on arbitrators to apply the
treaties.
In particular, the arbitrators have in the great
majority of cases not applied fork-in-the-road
clauses to preclude a treaty claim (where the
claimant or a related party had previously
resorted to domestic courts). 15 This highlights
the arbitrators’ tendency to adopt expansive
approaches even in the face of express
language that appears to limit the arbitrators’
power.

PDF version, page 12: “As a matter of
principle, the EU’s approach favours domestic
courts.”

This is a misleading statement unless one reads
a lot into the Commission’s qualifier “[a]s a
matter of principle”.
If the Commission wanted to “favour”
domestic courts, it could easily do so. It could
require foreign investors – like any other
foreign national – to go first to domestic courts
where the courts offer justice and are
reasonably-available. Instead, the Commission
has declined to include this duty. This assumes
that domestic courts are potentially biased,
unreliable, etc. in all situations where a foreign
investor brings a claim. This aspect of the

15

Van Harten (2013) p gb forks in road.
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CETA contrasts starkly with the Commission’s
statement in the consultation text.

PDF version, page 12: “The EU aims to
provide incentives for investors to pursue
claims in domestic courts or to seek amicable
solutions – such as mediation. The EU will
suggest different instruments to do this. One is
to prolong the relevant time limits if an
investor goes to domestic courts or mediation
on the same matter, so as not to discourage an
investor from pursuing these avenues.”

This is a weak way to “provide incentives” for
investors to pursue claims in domestic courts
or reach “amicable settlements”. Indeed, the
Commission says only that it seeks “not to
discourage” foreign investors from resorting to
domestic courts or settlement. To incent the
use of domestic courts, a foreign investor
should be required to show that domestic
courts are not reasonably-available.
On settlements, one person’s amicable
settlement is another person’s regulatory chill.
Even the fact of a settlement may not be public
if the settlement was reached before the foreign
investor filed its formal request for
consultations (see Canada-EU CETA, Article
x-33(2)). In this way, the Commission’s
approach is “not to discourage” governments
from secretly paying public funds or chilling
decisions in order to appease a foreign
investor.

PDF version, page 12: “Another important
element is to make sure that investors cannot
bring claims on the same matter at the same
time in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic
courts. The EU will also ensure that companies
affiliated with the investor cannot bring claims
in front of an ISDS tribunal and domestic
courts on the same matter and at the same
time.”

The Commission’s approach allows foreign
investors to have their cake and eat it too.
Foreign investors will be free to pursue public
compensation in investor-state arbitration
(where compensation is the primary remedy).
They will also be free to pursue non-monetary
orders in domestic courts (where compensation
is usually a secondary remedy in claims against
the state).
Thus, the Commission entrenches and expands
the advantages for foreign investors, relative to
all others, due to their special right to pursue
investor-state arbitration.
The Commission’s approach essentially tracks
NAFTA, which also requires foreign investors
to pursue monetary remedies in investor-state
arbitration or domestic courts but not both.
38

EU Public consultation on investor-state arbitration in TTIP – Comment – Gus Van Harten
That is all. To be clear, this is not a duty to
exhaust reasonably-available local remedies or
a true fork-in-the-road clause. By the way,
based on the existing record of arbitrator
decision-making, 16 the former and especially
the latter should not be treated as a reliable
way to avoid parallel treaty proceedings if left
in the hands of arbitrators who have a financial
stake in allowing a treaty claim to proceed.

PDF version, page 12: “If there are other
relevant or related cases, ISDS tribunals must
take these into account. This is done to avoid
any risk that the investor is over-compensated
and helps to ensure consistency by excluding
the possibility for parallel claims.”

This is another weak response to the problem
of parallel treaty proceedings. It is standard
practice in any adjudicative process for the
adjudicator to be able to take into account other
relevant cases. That the Commission would
find it necessary to make this statement is
revealing of the track record of arbitrators.
Above all, an arbitrator can easily take into
account (and distinguish) other cases to suit
some instrumental purpose. What is needed is
a judicial system that is subject to jurisdictional
review, appeals, conflict-of-interest challenges,
and so on based on the usual judicial standards.

General response to Question 8: Arbitrator ethics, conduct and qualifications
Question: [P]lease provide your views on these procedures and in particular on the Code of
Conduct and the requirements for the qualifications for arbitrators in relation to the TTIP
agreement. Do they improve the existing system and can further improvements be envisaged?
The Commission’s proposals on this issue are a major disappointment. They do not acknowledge
the institutional reasons for the lack of independence and impartiality in investor-state
arbitration. In turn, they lead only to limited and inadequate tweaks.
In particular, the Commission makes no commitment to incorporate the essential safeguards of
judicial independence that are present in other adjudicative systems that review sovereign
conduct. These include:
(a) secure tenure for the adjudicator instead of case-by-case appointments,
(b) set remuneration by the state instead of for-profit case-by-case appointment,
16

Van Harten (2013) p Gb record on parallel claims.
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(c) an objective method of case assignment instead of executive discretion over case-bycase appointment,
(d) prohibitions on outside lawyering by the adjudicators instead of widespread doubledipping and issue conflict, and
(e) a judicial process to resolve conflict-of-interest claims instead of a process controlled
by executive officials.
Clearly, the Commission is not going to ensure that investor-state arbitration is made
independent and impartial at an institutional level. Thus, there will remain a basis for reasonable
suspicions of bias in the system.
The Commission needs to do the obvious: replace financially-dependent arbitrators with proper
judges. Why has it not done so?
Specific response to Question 8: Arbitrator ethics, conduct and qualifications

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 12: “There is concern that
arbitrators on ISDS tribunals do not always act
in an independent and impartial manner.
Because the individuals in question may not
only act as arbitrators, but also as lawyers for
companies or governments, concerns have
been expressed as to potential bias or conflicts
of interest.”

The Commission states the concern about lack
of arbitrator independence and impartiality in
narrow terms. The real concern arises from the
institutional structure of investor-state
arbitration. It is not just a matter of the conduct
of individual arbitrators.
In the absence of the usual institutional
safeguards of judicial independence – such as
secure tenure, set remuneration, objective case
assignments, prohibitions on outside
lawyering, and a judicial process to resolve
conflict-of-interest claims – reasonable
perceptions of arbitrator bias arise. The
perceptions of bias may operate in favour of an
investor or a state depending on the
circumstances.
For example, because arbitrators are appointed
on a case-by-case basis (and paid lucratively
by the appointment), all of them – and all
lawyers who litigate the cases – depend on
whoever has the ability to make the claims and
trigger the arbitrators’ appointments. In the
present one-way system, only foreign investors
have this ability.
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Also, if they want to be re-appointed, the
arbitrators depend on those with the power to
appoint an arbitrator when the disputing parties
do not agree or do not appoint. In the CanadaEU CETA, the Commission would give this
vital power to the Secretary General of ICSID.
This person is an international executive
official appointed via a nomination of the
World Bank President and a majority vote of
the states-parties to the ICSID Convention.
It offends judicial independence to give an
executive official the power to choose who will
decide a case after the official knows who has
sued whom and in what context. The issue here
is not actual bias. It is the reasonable suspicion
that the executive official will favour investors
over states, some investors over other
investors, or some states over other states. For
example, the ICSID Secretary-General owes
his or her position to the World Bank President
who is largely and effectively an appointee of
the U.S. Administration.
This allocation of appointing power is
comparable to historical contracts between
U.S. firms and Caribbean countries that
provided for arbitration (under the contract)
with default appointing power exercised by to
the U.S. Secretary of State. At present, the
Commission proposes to give appointing
power – in arbitrations by U.S. companies
against Europe or by European companies
against the U.S. – to an executive official who
is connected to the U.S. Administration. It is an
open question why the EU would take this
approach instead of an independent process in
which judges were assigned to cases by an
objective method such as lottery or rotation.
These are not the only inappropriate
dependencies of arbitrators. One may
reasonably suspect – based on the economic
incentives of arbitrators – that arbitrators also
depend on senior gatekeepers in the arbitration
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industry or on powerful governments that push
treaties providing for investor-state arbitration.
The resulting suspicions may operate in favour
of some investors or states and against others.
The essential problem arises from the decision
not to have institutional safeguards of judicial
independence in the final resolution of disputes
about public law, public policy, and public
finances. Institutional safeguards are vital in
this context because the disputes always affect
third parties and the public. There is no
compelling reason to use arbitrators instead
judges to make the important decisions in
investor-state arbitration.
As an aside, it is important to highlight a form
of conflict of interest – so-called issue conflict
– that is widespread in the system. Issue
conflict arises because arbitrators are allowed
to work concurrently as lawyers in investorstate arbitration. Many arbitrators act regularly
as arbitrators and lawyers and, presumably,
often rule on issues that are of interest to a
paying client in another case.
It is impossible to know whether issue conflict
has arisen in any particular case because many
investor-state arbitrations are confidential.
Unless the arbitrator declares it, a party or
member of the public will not be able to
examine the arbitrator’s role as counsel in
another case. Indeed, all of the cases arguably
raise similar issues because all of them require
the arbitrators to resolve jurisdictional issues
such as the definition of “investment” and
“investor”.
In this respect, the absence of a basic
institutional safeguard of independence puts all
arbitrators who work as arbitrators and lawyers
in the system in a conflict-of interest.
The Commission does not discuss these and
other problems arising from the institutional
structure. The Commission does not avert to
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the role of institutional safeguards as a basis
for judicial independence. Instead, the
Commission focuses on the conduct of
individual arbitrators. This is a bad sign. It
signals that none of the Commission’s reforms
will address the systemic taint that follows
from a process that lacks integrity in this basic
way.

PDF version, page 13: “Most existing
investment agreements do not address the issue
of the conduct or behaviour of arbitrators.
International rules on arbitration address the
issue by allowing the responding government
or the investor to challenge the choice of
arbitrator because of concerns of suitability.”

Clearly, the Commission is not proposing to
adopt the necessary institutional safeguards of
independence other than some very limited
measures.
For example, the provision for conflict-ofinterest challenges is a re-packaging of existing
processes in ICSID arbitration. It allows the
Secretary General of ICSID, an executive
official, to decide conflict-of-interest
challenges against arbitrators. This offends
judicial independence. A judicial process
requires that judges make the decisions and, in
turn, that a conflict-of-interest challenge to a
judge is decided by other judges.
A related problem is that there are no rules of
procedure in investor-state arbitration that
reproduce the independence and fairness of a
judicial proceeding. For reasons of
independence and fairness, the rules must be
applied by judges. Such rules could be
included in a new treaty like the CETA but
they have not been.
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PDF version, page 13: “The EU aims to
establish clear rules to ensure that arbitrators
are independent and act ethically. The EU will
introduce specific requirements in the TTIP on
the ethical conduct of arbitrators, including a
code of conduct. This code of conduct will be
binding on arbitrators in ISDS tribunals set up
under TTIP. The code of conduct also
establishes procedures to identify and deal with
any conflicts of interest.”

The utility of a code of conduct depends on its
content and enforcement. For example, will the
Commission’s proposed code be applied by an
independent judge or an executive official?
Will it preclude the dual roles of arbitrator as
lawyers? Unfortunately, the Commission has
not released any code of conduct or, it appears,
included a code in the CETA.
If the Commission could not manage a code of
conduct in a treaty with Canada (whose own
Agreement on Internal Trade has a code of
conduct written into its mechanism for personto-government arbitration), why would one
think that the Commission would include a
code in the TTIP?
Most importantly, a code of conduct, even if
binding, is not a substitute for other
institutional safeguards of judicial
independence.

PDF version, page 13: “Failure to abide by
these ethical rules will result in the removal of
the arbitrator from the tribunal. For example, if
a responding state considers that the arbitrator
chosen by the investor does not have the
necessary qualifications or that he has a
conflict of interest, the responding state can
challenge the appointment. If the arbitrator is
in breach of the Code of Conduct, he/she will
be removed from the tribunal. In case the ISDS
tribunal has already rendered its award and a
breach of the code of conduct is found, the
responding state or the investor can request a
reversal of that ISDS finding.”

The integrity of any process for conflict-ofinterest challenges depends on who decides the
challenges. The Commission does not mention
here that, in the Canada-EU CETA (Article x25(10)), the challenges will be decided by an
executive official, the Secretary-General of
ICSID.

PDF version, page 13: “In the text provided as
reference (the draft EU-Canada Agreement),
the Parties (i.e. the EU and Canada) have
agreed for the first time in an investment
agreement to include rules on the conduct of

The Commission should have released the
rules of conduct as part of the consultation.

This highlights the lack of integrity in investorstate arbitration. In essence, it re-assigns
judicial power from courts to a mix of forprofit arbitrators and executive officials. These
other actors do not have the claims to
institutional independence of a judge who is
subject to the usual safeguards.
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arbitrators, and have included the possibility to
improve them further if necessary. In the
context of TTIP these would be directly
included in the agreement.”

PDF version, page 12: “Some have also
expressed concerns about the qualifications of
arbitrators and that they may not have the
necessary qualifications on matters of public
interest or on matters that require a balancing
between investment protection and e.g.
environment, health or consumer
protection….”
PDF version, page 13: “As regards the
qualifications of ISDS arbitrators, the EU aims
to set down detailed requirements for the
arbitrators who act in ISDS tribunals under
TTIP. They must be independent and impartial,
with expertise in international law and
international investment law and, if possible,
experience in international trade law and
international dispute resolution. Among those
best qualified and who have undertaken such
tasks will be retired judges, who generally have
experience in ruling on issues that touch upon
both trade and investment and on societal and
public policy issues.”

First, the Commission identifies a legitimate
concern that arbitrator lack “the necessary
qualifications on matters of public interest or
on matters that require a balancing between
investment protection and e.g. environment,
health or consumer protection.” Yet it responds
by continuing the usual practice of requiring
arbitrators to have expertise in international
law, international investment law, and
international trade law. The Commission does
not institute any requirement for qualifications
in the affected area of decision-making, such as
environment, health or consumer protection.
Second, the Commission suggests that retired
judges may be well-suited to the role of
investor-state arbitrator or may have relevant
experience in deciding policy disputes. Yet the
Commission does not take the logical step of
requiring all arbitrators to be judges and to
have relevant policy expertise.
Third, the Commission does not mention the
problem that a retired judge who actively seeks
re-appointment as an arbitrator is affected by
the same economic interest that gives rise to
appearances of bias among other arbitrators.
Fourth, a statement that someone will be
independent is obviously not a substitute for
institutional safeguards of their independence.
Thus, a declaration by states, an arbitrator, or
anyone else that arbitrators “must be
independent and impartial” is of little value
where the institutional structure creates
reasonable suspicions of bias.
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PDF version, page 13: “The EU also aims to
set up a roster, i.e. a list of qualified
individuals from which the Chairperson for the
ISDS tribunal is drawn, if the investor or the
responding state cannot otherwise agree to a
Chairperson. The purpose of such a roster is to
ensure that the EU and the US have agreed to
and vetted the arbitrators to ensure their
abilities and independence. In this way the
responding state chooses one arbitrator and has
vetted the third arbitrator.”

A roster could be a key element of a project to
judicialize investor-state arbitration. Yet the
Commission’s proposal for a roster has fatal
flaws.
First, we are told little about the roster. This
makes it impossible to evaluate its
effectiveness to ensure independence and
proper qualifications. Will the roster members
have secure tenure and a set salary? Will they
be barred from work as a lawyer during and
after their service on the roster?
Second, what we are told in the Canada-EU
CETA is not reassuring. The roster will apply
to presiding arbitrators only. This leaves it
open to states, investors, and appointing
authorities to choose unqualified individuals
who have not been vetted and have
inappropriate economic incentives.
Also, an executive official (the Secretary
General of ICSID) will choose who is
appointed from the roster to individual cases.
As a result, the roster is not judicial. It lacks an
objective method of case assignment.
Further, the Secretary General of ICSID will be
able to appoint arbitrators from outside the
roster if the states parties to the treaty have not
agreed on the roster members. In the NAFTA
context, a similar roster of presiding arbitrators
was proposed but left un-filled and then never
used. This is a major loophole in the CETA.
Thus, even based on what little we know about
the roster, it will not address the lack of
institutional independence in the system.
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General response to Question 9: Reducing the risk of frivolous and unfounded cases
Question: Please provide your views on [the Commission’s proposed] mechanisms for the
avoidance of frivolous or unfounded claims and the removal of incentives in relation to the TTIP
agreement. Please also indicate any other means to limit frivolous or unfounded claims.
The Commission’s approach leaves it to arbitrators – who would earn significant income if the
claim proceeded – to weed out frivolous claims. Obviously, frivolous claims should be vetted by
someone who does not have a financial stake in the outcome of the decision to vet. The
Commission has also not addressed similar issues that arise in the context of parallel treaty
proceedings.
The Commission’s provision for cost-shifting is helpful but will not affect the key cases: those in
which a deep-pocketed company brings a claim involving large sums. Whether frivolous or not,
such cases create pressure on governments to settle – including by regulatory chill – to avoid
even a low risk of potentially vast fiscal liability. This is an essential feature of the special rights
and advantages of foreign investors in investor-state arbitration.
Specific response to Question 9: Reducing the risk of frivolous and unfounded cases

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 14: “As in all legal
systems, cases are brought that have little or no
chance of succeeding (so-called “frivolous
claims”). Despite eventually being rejected by
the tribunals, such cases take up time and
money for the responding state. There have
been concerns that protracted and frequent
litigation in ISDS could have an effect on the
policy choices made by states.”

The Commission is right to highlight this
concern. That said, it is not always the case, as
suggested by the Commission, that frivolous
claims are rejected by tribunals.

PDF version, page 14: “Another issue is the
cost of ISDS proceedings. In many ISDS cases,
even if the responding state is successful in
defending its measures in front of the ISDS
tribunal, it may have to pay substantial
amounts to cover its own defence.”

The Commission is right to highlight the
excessive cost of investor-state arbitration. The
costs are partly the result of arbitrators’
expansive interpretations. The weeding out of
frivolous claims does not address this larger
issue.

Further, the rationale for weeding out frivolous
claims also applies to parallel treaty
proceedings. In many cases, arbitrators have
taken advantage of ambiguous treaty language
to allow parallel claims. As discussed under
Question 7 above, the Commission has not
addressed this problem.
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PDF version, page 14: “Under existing
investment agreements, there are generally no
rules dealing with frivolous claims.”

This is misleading. Any adjudicator has an
ability to weed out frivolous claims. It is not a
new step to give tribunals this power. The only
novelty of the Commission’s approach,
following the U.S. lead in other treaties such as
CAFTA, is to include an express mechanism
for reviewing frivolous claims.
Incidentally, this reform highlights that
virtually any procedural or substantive problem
in the system can be addressed by express
language in the treaty.

PDF version, page 14: “Some arbitration rules
however do have provisions on frivolous
claims. As a result, there is a risk that frivolous
or clearly unfounded claims are allowed to
proceed. Even though the investor would lose
such claims, the long proceedings and the
implied questions surrounding policy can be
problematic.”

It is highly doubtful that all frivolous claims
have been lost by the investor. For example,
did the investor lose in the St. Mary’s NAFTA
arbitration against Canada, which was settled
after the federal government argued that the
claimant had manufactured its U.S. nationality
and had no right to sue? In the settlement of
that case, a provincial government paid $15
million to St. Mary’s to settle all ongoing and
future litigation in the dispute. 17 If the NAFTA
claim was frivolous, as the federal government
argued, it certainly was also fruitful for the
investor.
The arbitrators have taken an expansive
approach to many issues in the treaties. This
raises the question of what one means by
frivolous. It also highlights the link between
the arbitrators’ extension of their power into
new areas and, as the Commission puts it,
“implied questions surrounding policy”.

PDF version, page 14:
“The EU will introduce several instruments in
TTIP to quickly dismiss frivolous claims.
ISDS tribunals will be required to dismiss
17

This is a weak response to the in-built
structural bias in favour of claimants and,
specifically, frivolous claims. First, tribunals
will not be “required” to dismiss claims; they
will only be given an express power and
process to do so.

Government of Ontario, press release (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 8 March 2013).
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claims that are obviously without legal merit or
legally unfounded. For example, this would be
cases where the investor is not established in
the US or the EU, or cases where the ISDS
tribunal can quickly establish that there is in
fact no discrimination between domestic and
foreign investors. This provides an early and
effective filtering mechanism for frivolous
claims thereby avoiding a lengthy litigation
process.”

PDF version, page 14: “To further discourage
unfounded claims, the EU is proposing that the
losing party should bear all costs of the
proceedings. So if investors take a chance at
bringing certain claims and fail, they have to
pay the full financial costs of this attempt.”

Second, the Commission gives arbitrators the
power to decide whether a case in which they
will earn significant income should go ahead.
This creates an obvious conflict-of-interest.
Frivolous claims should be vetted by one who
has no financial stake in the outcome of the
decision to vet.

This is a positive development, especially due
to the growth in speculative financing of
claims by outside actors. On the other hand, it
will not affect the most important scenario
where a deep-pocketed company brings a claim
involving large sums. Whether frivolous or
not, such cases always create pressure on the
state to settle – including by regulatory chill –
to avoid even a low risk of massive financial
liability.
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General response to Question 10: Allowing claims to proceed (filter)
Question: [W]hat are your views on the use and scope of such filter mechanisms in the TTIP
agreement?
The Commission’s filter mechanisms, following the U.S. lead, are positive. However, there is no
principled reason to defend the right to regulate for the financial sector only. Joint screening of
claims by relevant regulators in the host state and home state should be available for all claims.
This would put a useful check against abuse of arbitrator power, especially since the
Commission plans to rely on for-profit arbitrators and does not affirm the right to regulate
effectively. The filter mechanisms are also limited because they require the consent of both states
parties. They are not a substitute for a clear and unequivocal statement of the state’s right to
regulate in the treaty.
Specific response to Question 10: Allowing claims to proceed (filter)

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 15: “The majority of
existing investment agreements privilege the
original intention of such agreements, which
was to avoid the politicisation of disputes, and
therefore do not contain provisions or
mechanisms which allow the Parties the
possibility to intervene under particular
circumstances in ISDS cases.”

Investor-state arbitration is not depoliticized
when an executive official has the power to
decide who should be the judge in a particular
case. This allows the priorities of the executive
to infiltrate the adjudicative process. Depoliticization requires a process that is
independent of the executive (and other
powerful actors).
At present, investor-state arbitration depends
on the actual or perceived preferences of
executive officials. All the arbitrators are
chosen either by executive officials directly or
by the disputing parties against the backdrop of
executive appointing power.

PDF version, page 15: “The EU like many
other states considers it important to protect the
right to regulate in the financial sector and,
more broadly, the overriding need to maintain
the overall stability and integrity of the
financial system, while also recognizing the
speed needed for government action in case of
financial crisis.”

Presumably the Commission considers it
important to protect the right to regulate
beyond the financial sector. Why has it not
allowed joint screening, by the relevant
regulators in the host and home states, for all
claims by investors?
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General response to Question 11:
Guidance by the Parties (the EU and the US) on the interpretation of the agreement
Question: [P]lease provide your views on [the Commission’s proposed] approach to ensure
uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement to correct the balance? Are
these elements desirable, and if so, do you consider them to be sufficient?
It should be standard practice to allow submissions and agreed interpretations by the states
parties, using express terms in the treaty. That said, neither mechanism is reliable to ensure
uniformity and predictability.
In the NAFTA context, where these mechanisms have a long history, tribunals have decided
against the joint submissions of states parties. Also, agreed interpretations have been used only
twice under NAFTA; in a third instance, a proposed interpretation was blocked by one state
party. Thus, the mechanisms have proven to be a limited response to the lack of uniformity and
predictability and to other concerns about arbitrator decision-making.
Most importantly, neither mechanism addresses the lack of independence, fairness, and balance
in investor-state arbitration.
Specific response to Question 11:
Guidance by the Parties (the EU and the US) on the interpretation of the agreement

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 15-16: “When countries
negotiate an agreement, they have a common
understanding of what they want the agreement
to mean. However, there is a risk that any
tribunal, including ISDS tribunals interprets
the agreement in a different way, upsetting the
balance that the countries in question had
achieved in negotiations – for example,
between investment protection and the right to
regulate. This is the case if the agreement
leaves room for interpretation.”

The Commission is right to highlight this issue.
Yet the Commission downplays the tendency
of arbitrators to expand their power. It has been
common for arbitrators to adopt expansive
approaches even in the face of relatively clear
language in the treaty.

PDF version, page 16:

This is prudent in the face of unchecked
arbitrator power. However, neither mechanism
is reliable to ensure uniformity and
predictability. Also, neither mechanism is new;

“It is therefore necessary to have mechanisms
which will allow the Parties (the EU and the

This emphasizes the need to replace arbitrators
with judges who are institutionally independent
of a financial incentive to favour claimants,
executive officials, senior gatekeepers, etc.
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US) to clarify their intentions on how the
agreement should be interpreted….

both have been a part of the U.S. approach
since at least 1994.

The EU will make it possible for the nondisputing Party (i.e. the EU or the US) to
intervene in ISDS proceedings between an
investor and the other Party. This means that in
each case, the Parties can explain to the
arbitrators and to the Appellate Body how they
would want the relevant provisions to be
interpreted. Where both Parties agree on the
interpretation, such interpretation is a very
powerful statement, which ISDS tribunals
would have to respect.

On submissions by the states parties, in the
NAFTA context, tribunals in various cases
have declined to adopt the shared
interpretations of the affected states (i.e. the
home and host state of the investor, or even all
states parties).

The EU would also provide for the Parties (i.e.
the EU and the US) to adopt binding
interpretations on issues of law, so as to correct
or avoid interpretations by tribunals which
might be considered to be against the common
intentions of the EU and the US. Given the
EU’s intention to give clarity and precision to
the investment protection obligations of the
agreement, the scope for undesirable
interpretations by ISDS tribunals is very
limited. However, this provision is an
additional safety-valve for the Parties.”

Second, the mechanism of agreed
interpretations has been a limited way to
manage the arbitrators’ power. In the NAFTA
context, the mechanism has been used very
rarely and has always left room for an
arbitrator to avoid the intended effect in future
cases.
To make the process more credible and
uniform, judges should be charged with
interpreting and applying the treaties –
including any agreed interpretations.
Finally, the Commission’s statement that “the
scope for undesirable interpretations by ISDS
tribunals is very limited” is not credible. It
reminds me of the king who sent the palace
guard to defend against a sand storm. There are
numerous examples of arbitrators’ taking
advantage of treaty ambiguity in order to
expand their power in questionable ways.
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General response to Question 12: Appellate Mechanism and consistency of rulings
Question: [P]lease provide your views on the creation of an appellate mechanism in TTIP as a
means to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation of the agreement.
The idea of an appellate body is not new. It has been floated in the U.S. for at least 10 years but
now appears to be a dead issue there. If the Commission was serious about an appellate body,
why not insist on one in the Canada-EU CETA? Canada is a much weaker negotiating partner
than the U.S.
Even if an appellate body could be negotiated, it would leave intact the role of for-profit
arbitrators in deciding disputes. For this and other reasons, it would not address the lack of
independence and fairness in the system. The arbitrators should be replaced with judges
throughout the process with at least one level of appellate judicial review. Otherwise, one may
have more uniformity and predictability that remains tainted by the lack of basic integrity in the
decision-making process.
Specific response to Question 12: Appellate Mechanism and consistency of rulings

Statements in the consultation text

Comments

PDF version, page 16: “In existing investment
agreements, the decision by an ISDS tribunal is
final. There is no possibility for the responding
state, for example, to appeal to a higher
instance to challenge the level of compensation
or other aspects of the ISDS decision except on
very limited procedural grounds. There are
concerns that this can lead to different or even
contradictory interpretations of the provisions
of international investment agreements. There
have been calls by stakeholders for a
mechanism to allow for appeal to increase
legitimacy of the system and to ensure
uniformity of interpretation.”

The Commission does not mention that there is
no possibility for review in any domestic or
international court under the ICSID Rules.
Instead, the arbitrators’ decisions are reviewed
by a committee of three other arbitrators, all
appointed by the World Bank President. The
World Bank President is an executive official
who is chosen primarily and effectively by the
U.S. Administration. This challenge to judicial
independence is a bigger problem than the lack
of uniformity of interpretation.

PDF version, page 17: “No existing
international investment agreements provide
for an appeal on legal issues. International
arbitration rules allow for annulment of ISDS
rulings under certain very restrictive conditions

The Commission is right to highlight the
limited options for review of arbitrator
decisions. As discussed earlier, the arbitrators’
powers are among the most profound of any
adjudicator.

In any event, the Commission could address
both problems by replacing arbitrators with
judges in both first-instance proceedings and
appeals.
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relating to procedural issues.”

PDF version, page 17: “The EU aims to
establish an appellate mechanism in TTIP so as
to allow for review of ISDS rulings. It will
help ensure consistency in the interpretation of
TTIP and provide both the government and the
investor with the opportunity to appeal against
awards and to correct errors. This legal review
is an additional check on the work of the
arbitrators who have examined the case in the
first place.
In agreements under negotiation by the EU, the
possibility of creating an appellate mechanism
in the future is envisaged. However, in TTIP
the EU intends to go further and create a
bilateral appellate mechanism immediately
through the agreement.”

An appellate body would be a positive step.
Yet it would not address the lack of
independence and fairness in investor-state
arbitration if the arbitrators were not replaced
with judges throughout the process.
The Commission has not obtained an appellate
mechanism in the Canada-EU CETA. This was
presumably an ideal context in which to
introduce such a mechanism in anticipation of
TTIP. Why would one expect the Commission
to deliver an appellate mechanism with the
U.S. where it did not with Canada?

Response to Question 13 (General assessment)
Question: What is your overall assessment of the proposed approach on substantive standards of
protection and ISDS as a basis for investment negotiations between the EU and US?
The Commission’s approach has a few positive elements. Overall, it is a failure. The
Commission does not affirm clearly and unequivocally the state’s right to regulate. It does not
introduce actionable responsibilities for foreign investors alongside their elaborate rights. It does
not require foreign investors to resort to domestic courts where the courts offer justice and are
reasonably-available. In turn, the Commission’s approach discriminates in favour of foreign
investors – by giving them a special status in their relationship to legislatures, governments, and
courts – and against other rights holders and the public interest. The Commission takes positive
steps on transparency but does not address the lack of institutional independence and procedural
fairness in investor-state arbitration. In important respects, the Commission makes these
problems worse.
Question: Do you see other ways for the EU to improve the investment system?
The clearest and most defensible step is to remove investor-state arbitration from the treaties.
The exceptional use of arbitration to resolve disputes about sovereign conduct and access to
public funds is flawed due to the lack of the usual safeguards of independence, openness, and
fairness and the lack of balance in the allocation of rights and responsibilities. The Commission’s
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proposed reforms take meaningful steps only on openness. They do little to address the other
flaws and in important respects make them worse.
Question: Are there any other issues related to the topics covered by the questionnaire that you
would like to address?
The consultation should have addressed the key question of whether to include investor-state
arbitration in the TTIP. This flaw in the consultation was discussed at the outset of this comment.
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